Operation Corkscrew
| Operation Corkscrew | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Battle of the Mediterranean and the Italian campaign of World War II | |||||||||
Men of the 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment, part of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 1st Division, advancing inland during Operation Corkscrew. | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
| United Kingdom | Italy | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Walter Clutterbuck | Gino Pavesi | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 14,000 | 11,420 | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 15 aircraft shot down |
40 killed 150 wounded 11,000 prisoners | ||||||||
Operation Corkscrew was the code name for the Allied invasion of the Italian island of Pantelleria (between Sicily and Tunisia) on 11 June 1943, prior to the Allied invasion of Sicily, during the Second World War. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force of the North African Theater of Operations gave orders for the Allied air forces to conduct an aerial offensive against the island defences, followed, if necessary, by an invasion.
Bombing began in May and on 6 June the tempo increased and from mid-May, 6,400 long tons (6,500 t) of bombs were dropped in 5,218 sorties by bombers and fighter-bombers, the main area attacked being 8 sq mi (21 km2). An Italian airlift began in June from Sicily by Savoia-Marchetti SM.82 transport aircraft delivered supplies at night. An acute water shortage developed on the island and an offer to surrender was broadcast on 11 June as an Allied invasion force waited offshore. Elements of the British 1st Infantry Division landed unopposed but faced sporadic resistance from Italian troops who had not received the order to surrender.
Advocates of air power claimed that the surrender vindicated the theories of air power developed between the wars but analysis of the ruins of the island defences soon led to the more extravagant claims of destruction being discredited and that the bombing had been more effective on the morale of the defenders. Somme Royal Air Force officers, like Arthur Tedder, head of the Mediterranean Air Command, became concerned that the army might demand that the RAF repeat the feat as a matter of routine.