Mali War

Mali War
Part of the War in the Sahel, war on terror and the War against the Islamic State

Military situation in Mali and neighboring countries as of 24 November 2025. For a detailed map, see here.
Date16 January 2012 – present
(14 years and 2 months)
Location
Mali
(with spillover into Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin)
Status Ongoing
Belligerents
2012–2013
2013–2022/23
2023–

Native militia 2014–

2015–23
2012

2012–15

2023–24

2024–
FLA Supported by:
Ukraine

2012–
  • CMI (2017–)
  • MAA (until 2013)
  • Other armed groups and self-defense militias
2012–2017

2017–
2015–2019
2019–
Commanders and leaders
Iyad Ag Ghaly
Mokhtar Belmokhtar 
Abdelhamid Abou Zeid 
Abdelmalek Droukdel 
Abu al-Bara' al-Sahrawi
Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi 
Abu Huzeifa 
Strength

Pre-war
12,150
Most recent
41,000
3,000


10,116
550


~500 (FLNA)
2012
2,800–6,000
2013
  • 3,000
  • 100
Unknown
Casualties and losses
2012
1,000+ casualties
2012–

2013–23
  • 311 killed
  • 2 killed
Unknown 2013–22 (against France)
2,800+ killed
Unknown
Total killed: 13,105
Displaced:
~144,000 refugees abroad
~230,000 internally displaced persons
Total: ≈374,000

The Mali War is an ongoing conflict that began on 16 January 2012 with a Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. The rebels included the secular-oriented National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a group fighting for independence or greater autonomy of a region they called Azawad. The MNLA was initially allied with the jihadist Ansar Dine, which, in turn, was allied to other Salafi jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its splinter, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA).

On 22 March 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis, a month before a presidential election was to have taken place. Mutinous soldiers, calling themselves the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State, took control and suspended the constitution of Mali. During the uncertainty that followed, resistance put up by government forces in the north began to melt away, enabling the rebels to capture the three provincial capitals of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao in three days. On 6 April 2012, stating that it had secured all of its desired territory, the MNLA declared independence from Mali, which was rejected as invalid by the African Union and the European Union.

The MNLA and the jihadist groups soon found themselves at odds, unable to reconcile their conflicting visions for Azawad. Efforts to find common ground failed, and open conflict broke out between them, resulting in a decisive defeat for the MNLA. The jihadists seized control of nearly all of Azawad, with only a few towns and isolated pockets remaining under MNLA and allied militia control.

The government of Mali asked for foreign military help to re-take the north. On 11 January 2013, the French military began operations against the Islamists. By the time of the 2013 presidential election, thanks to French, African, and international military support, government forces had regained most of the territory previously controlled by Islamists and Tuareg nationalists.

A peace deal between the government and Tuareg rebels was signed on 18 June 2013, however on 26 September 2013 the rebels pulled out of the peace agreement and claimed that the government had not respected its commitments to the truce. In mid-2014, the French military in Mali ended its Operation Serval and transitioned to the broader regional counterterrorist effort, Operation Barkhane. In June 2015, negotiations between the government, the pro-government Platform coalition, and the rebel Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) culminated in the Algiers Accords, which aimed to decentralize the Malian state, integrate former rebels into the national army, and promote economic development in the north. Despite this, fighting between the two coalitions and various splinter groups continued periodically.

In 2017, Ansar Dine, the Sahara branch of AQIM, Katiba Macina, and the rest of Al-Mourabitoun merged to form the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) coalition, pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, then-leader of Al-Qaeda. From the founding of the Islamic State – Sahel Province in 2015, the proxy groups of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the country, in what researchers called the "Sahel exception" or "Sahel anomaly", peacefully co-existed in their fights against the Malian government and her allies.

By the first half of 2018, rebel attacks had intensified significantly, and by July of that year, northern Mali had largely slipped from government control. Jihadist activity was no longer confined to the north; it expanded rapidly into central Mali. By 2020, some estimates suggested that only one-third of the country remained under government authority. The "jihadist idyll" ended in 2019 when open conflict broke out between JNIM and the ISSP.

Following mass protests, elements of the Malian armed forces, led by Special Forces Col. Assimi Goïta, began a mutiny, and subsequently undertook a coup d'état against Keita in 2020. Bah Ndaw was appointed interim president, although it was presumed he would serve as a figurehead, as Goïta, being in the military, would have been controversial in the eyes of Western governments. A second coup by Goïta followed in 2021 due to differences between them and their respective camps over whether to cooperate with France or Russia.

By the end of the year, hundreds of Wagner Group mercenaries, who would go on to commit several civilian massacres, began deploying across Mali. Their presence prompted strong objections from international forces, despite widespread anti-French sentiment among the Malian population. In February 2022, Canada, France, and its European partners announced a full troop withdrawal within six months, citing Wagner's presence.

In 2023, the withdrawal of MINUSMA and the handover of its 12 military bases at the junta's request heightened tensions between the government and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP), a coalition of the CMA and Platform. Disputes arose particularly over bases in Ber and the Kidal region, which they argued, under the accords, they were entitled to, even if small army units may be located there. They would not allow the army to take over the bases without prior negotiations. Later, after previously accusing the junta and Wagner of multiple ceasefire and human rights violations, the CMA declared war on the government, prompting most Platform groups to leave the CSP. On 30 November 2024, the members of the CSP dissolved themselves and merged into the Azawad Liberation Front, officially returning to demands for the independence of Azawad.