Dnieper–Carpathian offensive
| Dnieper–Carpathian offensive | |||||||||
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| Part of the Eastern Front of World War II | |||||||||
Soviet advances during the operation | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
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Soviet Union Czechoslovak Army Corps |
Germany Romania Hungary | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Joseph Stalin Georgy Zhukov Nikolai Vatutin † Ivan Konev Aleksandr Vasilevsky Rodion Malinovsky Feodor Tolbukhin Pavel Kurochkin Lev Vladimirsky |
Adolf Hitler Erich von Manstein Walther Model Ewald von Kleist Ferdinand Schörner Hans-Valentin Hube Erhard Raus Otto Wöhler Karl-Adolf Hollidt Wilhelm Stemmermann † Petre Dumitrescu Ioan Mihail Racoviță Géza Lakatos | ||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
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1st Ukrainian Front 2nd Ukrainian Front 3rd Ukrainian Front 4th Ukrainian Front 2nd Belorussian Front | |||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
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2,406,100 personnel 2,015 tanks and self-propelled guns 28,654 guns and mortars 2,600 aircraft 2,111,987 personnel 2,652 operational tanks and self-propelled guns 611 tanks and self-propelled guns in repair 27,718 guns and mortars 1,621 aircraft |
915,721 personnel 300,000+ personnel (by spring 1944) 3,235 guns and mortars 1,344 anti-tank guns 150,000–180,000 personnel (by spring 1944) 30 operational tanks 30 operational assault guns 60 operational armored vehicles in total 75 tanks in repairs | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
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270,198 killed or missing 839,330 wounded & sick 4,666 tanks/assault guns destroyed 7,532 artillery pieces lost 676 aircraft destroyed Total: 1,109,528 (including ~850,000 combat casualties) |
Germany 41,907 killed Total: 250,956 combat casualties OKH Reports: 379,688 combat casualties Grylev: 500,000 combat casualtiesRomania unknown Hungary unknown | ||||||||
The Dnieper–Carpathian offensive (Russian: Днепровско-Карпатская операция, romanized: Dneprovsko-Karpatskaya operatsiya), also known in Soviet historical sources as the Liberation of Right-bank Ukraine (Russian: Освобождение Правобережной Украины, romanized: Osvobozhdeniye Pravoberezhnoy Ukrainy), was a strategic offensive executed by the Soviet 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, along with the 2nd Belorussian Front, against the German Army Group South, Army Group A and elements of Army Group Center, and fought from late December 1943 to early May 1944. The battles in right-bank Ukraine and in the Crimea were the most important event of the 1944 winter-spring campaign on the Eastern Front.
Consisting of a whole series of closely linked operations, the goal of this offensive was to split the Wehrmacht's Army Group South and to clear the German-Romanian-Hungarian forces from most of the Ukrainian and Moldavian territories, which were occupied by Axis forces. It was one of the biggest offensives of World War II, stretching over a 1,200 km (745 mi) front, to a 450 km depth (280 mi) and involving almost 3,500,000 troops from both sides.
In the course of the operation, 20 Wehrmacht divisions were either destroyed, disbanded or required major rebuilding, while another 60 divisions were reduced to 50% of their establishment strength. Even worse were equipment losses, with thousands of precious tanks, assault guns, artillery and trucks being lost, principally through their abandonment in the spring mud. According to German general Kurt von Tippelskirch, this was the biggest Wehrmacht defeat since Stalingrad.
As a result of this strategic offensive, Wehrmacht's Army Group South was split into two parts, north and south of the Carpathian Mountains. The northern portion was pushed back into western Galicia, while the southern portion was pushed back into Romania. The northern portion was renamed to Army Group North Ukraine, while the southern portion to Army Group South Ukraine, which was effective from 5 April 1944, although very little of Ukraine remained in German hands. It was during this offensive that the Red Army reached the June 1941 borders of the USSR, recapturing the territory seized during the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland.
Because of the Wehrmacht defeat, the commander of Army Group South Erich von Manstein and the commander of Army Group A Ewald von Kleist were dismissed by Hitler and replaced by Walther Model and Ferdinand Schörner respectively. This offensive marked the end of Manstein's career in the Wehrmacht.
In order to save its southern sector from complete collapse, the German high command was forced to transfer eight divisions in January and February and another 26 German divisions as reinforcements between March and May from across France, Germany, Denmark, Poland, Balkans, Army Group Centre and Army Group North to the crumbling front of Army Group South. This amounted to a total of 34 divisions, and at least 1,200 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns.
As a result, the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive played a key role in influencing the future successes of the western Allies' Normandy landings and the Soviet Operation Bagration, as German forces stationed in France and belonging to Army Group Centre were critically weakened by the transfers. During the creation of the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket, the German forces stationed in France were deprived of 45,827 troops and 363 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns on 6 June 1944. Meanwhile, Army Group Center was deprived of a total of 125,380 troops and 552 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns on 22 June 1944.
In addition to the arrival of a large number of German reinforcements were those of Wehrmacht's Axis allies. As the Red Army approached the borders of Hungary and Romania, both countries mobilized their full resources and committed a combined total of 25 fresh divisions.
The Soviet success during this operation led the German High Command to conclude that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the area where the main Soviet summer offensive of 1944 would take place. For this reason, the German forces in the south, especially the crucial panzer divisions, received priority in reinforcements. The weakening of Army Group Centre during the Polesskoe offensive and German anticipation that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the place of the main Soviet summer offensive of 1944, had catastrophic consequences for the Germans during Operation Bagration.
This was the only offensive in which all six elite Soviet tank armies participated at the same time. Similarly, out of 30 panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions available to the Germans in late 1943, 22 were stationed in Ukraine.