Kamenets–Podolsky pocket

The Kamenets-Podolsky pocket (German: Kessel von Kamenez-Podolsk) was part of a major Soviet Proskurov-Chernovtsy Operation, (Russian: Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция), known on the German side by several names. It was conducted by the Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front against the German 1st and 4th Panzer Armies, Hungarian 1st Army (from April 1944) of Army Group South in March-April 1944. The plan was to launch the main strike in a southerly direction, at the boundary of the two German armies, thus cutting off the Lvov-Odessa railway line, vital for the supply of Army Group South. The subsequent southerly advance to the Dniester aimed to cut off retreat routes to the west for Army Group South, forcing it to use the long roundabout route through Romania for supply.

The offensive began on 4 March and the German front soon collapsed. By 10 March, the Lvov-Odessa railway was cut and the German front was penetrated to a depth of 60-100 kilometeres. At this point, the offensive came to a halt, due to the arrival of redeployed panzer divisions and OKH reserves. Furthermore, the Soviets experienced logistical difficulties of sustaining the offensive in conditions of rasputitsa. After regroupings and introducing the 1st Tank Army into the battle, the offensive resumed on 21 March. The German front collapsed entirely on the same day. On 23 March, connections of the 1st Panzer Army with the 4th Panzer Army were lost. On 24 March, the 1st Tank Army reached the Dniester. One after another, major communication centers fell to the Soviets- Proskurov, Kamenets-Podolsky, Chernovtsy. As a result, the 1st Panzer Army, numbering 200,000 personnel, was encircled in the area of Kamenets-Podolsky. The encirclement, however, was incomplete. The understrength Soviet units, operating on overextended supply lines over muddy roads, were unable to establish a tight encirclement, especially in the west. Moreover, in anticipation of the German breakout to the south across the Dniester, the Soviet command ordered the 1st Tank Army to cross to the southern bank, which excluded it from active combat against the encircled German forces.

The commander of the 1st Panzer Army, Generaloberst Hans Hube, had intended to breakout to the south, as the Soviets had anticipated. However, Hube was overruled by Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein, who insisted that the army must breakout to the west, relying on the element of surprise and because the Soviet forces there were weak. As a relief force attacking from the west, Manstein received the II SS Panzer Corps from France. The breakout to the west, supported by major airlift operations of the Luftwaffe, began at the end of March. Only at the start of April did the Soviet command realize that German forces were breaking out to the west. Parts of the 1st Tank Army were redeployed from southern bank of the Dniester, but this was hampered by the destruction of the river crossings by the Germans. On 4 April, the II SS Panzer Corps, whose arrival was undetected by the Soviets, struck from the west. By 10 April, the 1st Panzer Army connection with the 4th Panzer Army was reestablished.

After the breakout, the combat power of the 1st Panzer Army was greatly reduced. All of its divisions were rendered combat-ineffective or suitable only for limited defense. The losses in armoured vehicles, motor vehicles and heavy weapons were extremely high, with divisions possessing only a small number of them afterwards. The combat strength of the divisions, infantry foremost, was reduced to just a fraction of their strength, forcing the Germans to assign specialists and personnel from rear services to the frontline. According to the army’s field post inspection office, the hardships of this campaign had a devastating impact on the morale of the troops, being considered the hardest thing the troops had ever experienced, as expressed on various occasions by soldiers who had been on duty for four years or more.