2025 massacres of Syrian Alawites
| 2025 massacres of Syrian Alawites | |
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| Part of the Western Syria clashes and the March 2025 Western Syria clashes during the Syrian civil war | |
Map of the Syrian Coastal Mountain Range, which is home to most Alawites | |
| Location | Latakia, Tartus, Hama and Homs Governorates, Syria |
| Date | 6–27 March 2025 (main phase) (3 weeks) March 2025–present (1 year) |
| Target | Alawite civilians |
Attack type | Collective punishment, extrajudicial killings, sectarian violence, massacre, kidnappings |
| Deaths | Until 23 February: 151 in sectarian killings, 154 in other retaliatory killings (per SOHR) From 6 March:
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| Victims | Thousands of Alawites and Christians displaced |
| Perpetrators | |
| Motive | Syrian Armed Forces and associated parties:
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Personal
Political offices
President of Syria Incumbent
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A series of mass killings and massacres against Alawite people occurred in Syria from 6 March 2025 to 17 March 2025, with a resurgence in early April. Estimates of the death toll range from about 1,000 to 2,000, with some sources saying the majority of the victims were civilians. The attacks were carried out by armed groups aligned with the Syrian caretaker government, at least some of whom were engaged in a counter-insurgency operation against armed remnants of the former Assad regime in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War.
The targeting of Alawites was justified by the conflation of "regime remnants" with Alawite people in general, as the Assad family are themselves Alawites, had favored Alawites for government positions during their rule, and had positioned themselves as protectors of the Alawite community despite significant opposition from within it. The violence included many alleged cases of gunmen showing up at civilians' homes, asking them whether they were Alawite or Sunni, and then killing them if they answered "Alawite". Various parties have characterized this targeting of Alawites as a genocide or the potential leadup to one.
Especially deadly massacres began in early March 2025 in Latakia Governorate, where, according to the SOHR, Syrian security forces killed hundreds of civilians over the span of two days, including 52 Alawite individuals in the towns of Al-Mukhtariya and Al-Shir in rural Latakia alone. These events took place during a period of heightened tensions and armed clashes between Syrian transitional government forces and militants that are loyal to former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as described by Syrian authorities. Despite assurances by new government officials that minorities would be safe in the new Syria, Alawite communities have been subject to a number of massacres since December 2024.
Numerous perpetrators were suspected, including the Transitional Government's General Security Service and other former-HTS units and Turkish-backed militias such as the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division. In March 2025, Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa denied responsibility for the attacks. In his speech, al-Sharaa said that "remnants of the former regime" had no choice but to surrender immediately as he vowed to hold accountable "anyone involved in civilian bloodshed". He later promised to punish the perpetrators, saying that Assad loyalists and associated foreign powers committed the killings with the aim of destabilizing the Syrian state and restarting the civil war. In July 2025, an investigative committee submitted two lists of suspects to courts and announced its findings in a press conference. The committee's press conference did not attribute any responsibility for the massacres to Transitional Government forces.
On 10 March 2025, the Syrian government announced the end of counter-insurgency operations after expelling pro-Assad insurgents from "vital centres" and re-establishing control over most of the roadways in the coastal region. Despite al-Sharaa's statements, sectarian killings and kidnappings continued in Syria as of late 2025, with many cases remaining without charges for the perpetrators.