Mujibist militancy
| Mujibist Militancy | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Aftermath of the July uprising | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
|
Supported by |
Supported by Tribal insurgents | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
|
Muhammad Yunus |
Sheikh Hasina Obaidul Quader Saddam Hossain | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
|
Thousands Security Forces and Military personnels Unknown number of volunteers Dozens of underground Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party cells | Hundreds of Militants | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| Several student activists dead before Operation Devil hunt, Many policemen injured in Gopalganj riots | Dozens killed, Hundreds injured, Thousands arrested | ||||||||
Following the July Uprising in Bangladesh, there had been increase of political violence, militant activities, and even insurgent attributed uprisings by the loyalists of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and members of the Chhatra League, the student wing of the Awami League, following the collapse of Hasina's government on 5 August 2024 and the formation of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The period was marked by widespread unrest, including armed clashes, vandalism, harassment of opponents, and localized uprisings allegedly involving Awami League activists and student cadres. Analysts have described the phenomenon as a pro-Awami insurgency that emerged in response to the sudden downfall of the country's longest-serving prime minister.
The interim government responded by outlawing organisations linked to Hasina's political base. On 23 October 2024, the Chhatra League was banned under the Anti-Terrorism Act, with the government citing its involvement in murder, torture, sexual harassment, extortion, tender manipulation, and violent attacks during the protests. In May 2025, the ban was extended to cover the Awami League itself and all affiliated organisations, prohibiting their meetings, rallies, and online activities until judicial proceedings against party leaders are resolved. These steps marked the first time in Bangladesh's history that the country's largest political party was legally designated as a terrorist organisation.
Reports from rights groups and media outlets documented numerous violent incidents during the transitional period. Human Rights Watch noted that dozens of police stations were attacked or burned down, and at least 40 police officers were killed in clashes with protesters and loyalists of the ousted regime. Minority organisations reported 205 attacks on Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian communities in 52 districts in the immediate aftermath of Hasina's departure, with allegations that Awami League supporters were involved in some cases. At universities, student activists associated with the Chhatra League were accused of attacking rivals and attempting to reassert control over campus politics despite the government crackdown.
The characterization of these incidents as "militancy" is politically contested. Supporters of the interim government argue that pro-Hasina groups operated in ways resembling insurgent cells, employing arson, armed ambushes, and coordinated intimidation campaigns. However, critics contend that the government has used the label of militancy to justify sweeping bans on political opponents, suppress dissent, and centralise power under the guise of counter-terrorism. The phenomenon remains a subject of domestic and international debate, with implications for Bangladesh's democratic future and regional stability.