Memoirs v. Massachusetts
| Memoirs v. Massachusetts | |
|---|---|
| Argued December 7–8, 1965 Decided March 21, 1966 | |
| Full case name | A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure", et al. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts |
| Citations | 383 U.S. 413 (more) 86 S. Ct. 975; 16 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2906; 1 Media L. Rep. 1390 |
| Holding | |
| Since the First Amendment forbids censorship of expression of ideas not linked with illegal action, Fanny Hill cannot be proscribed. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Plurality | Brennan, joined by Warren, Fortas |
| Concurrence | Black, joined by Stewart |
| Concurrence | Douglas |
| Dissent | Clark |
| Dissent | Harlan |
| Dissent | White |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. I | |
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), is a United States Supreme Court decision clarifying a holding regarding obscenity made a decade earlier in Roth v. United States (1957).
Roth established that for a work of literature to be considered obscene, it had to be proven by censors to: 1) appeal to prurient interest, 2) be patently offensive, and 3) have no redeeming social value. The literature in Roth v. United States was the 1749 erotic novel Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (popularly known as Fanny Hill) by John Cleland, and the Court held in Memoirs that, while Fanny Hill might fit the first two criteria (it appealed to prurient interest and was patently offensive), it could not be proven that it had no redeeming social value. Specifically, it was held by the plurality opinion that a book could not be banned unless it were held to be "utterly without redeeming social value" [emphasis in original]. The judgment continued that the book could still be held obscene under certain circumstances—for instance, if it were marketed solely for its prurient appeal.