Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Maurice Merleau-Ponty | |
|---|---|
| Born | Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty 14 March 1908 Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Inférieure, France |
| Died | 3 May 1961 (aged 53) Paris, France |
| Other names | "Jacques Heller" |
| Education | |
| Education | École Normale Supérieure (M.A., 1929) University of Paris (Ph.D., 1945) |
| Academic advisor | Émile Bréhier |
| Philosophical work | |
| Era | 20th-century philosophy |
| Region | Western philosophy |
| School | Continental Phenomenology Western Marxism |
| Institutions | University of Lyon University of Paris Collège de France |
| Notable students | Michel Foucault Claude Lefort Trần Đức Thảo |
| Main interests | |
| Notable ideas |
|
Maurice Jean Jacques Merleau-Ponty (/ˌmɜːrloʊ ˈpɒnti/ MUR-loh PON-tee; French: [mɔʁis mɛʁlo pɔ̃ti]; 14 March 1908 – 3 May 1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The constitution of meaning in human experience was his main interest and he wrote on perception, art, politics, religion, biology, psychology, psychoanalysis, language, nature, and history. He was the lead editor of Les Temps modernes, the leftist magazine he established with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir in 1945.
At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role that perception plays in the human experience of the world. Merleau-Ponty understands perception to be an ongoing dialogue between one's lived body and the world which it perceives, in which perceivers passively and actively strive to express the perceived world in concert with others. He was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the twentieth century to engage extensively with the sciences. It is through this engagement that his writings became influential in the project of naturalising phenomenology, in which phenomenologists use the results of psychology and cognitive science.
Merleau-Ponty emphasised the body as the primary site of knowing the world, a corrective to the long philosophical tradition of placing consciousness as the source of knowledge, and maintained that the perceiving body and its perceived world could not be disentangled from each other. The articulation of the primacy of embodiment (corporéité) led him away from phenomenology towards what he was to call "indirect ontology" or the ontology of "the flesh of the world" (la chair du monde), seen in his final and incomplete work, The Visible and Invisible, and his last published essay, "Eye and Mind".