Mau Mau rebellion

Mau Mau rebellion
Part of the decolonisation of Africa

Troops of the King's African Rifles on watch for Mau Mau rebels
DateMain conflict:
7 October 1952 – 21 October 1956
(4 years and 2 weeks)
Mau Mau remnants:
1956–1960
Location
Result British victory
Belligerents

United Kingdom

Mau Mau rebels


Maasai Bands (from 1954)
Commanders and leaders
Winston Churchill
(1951–1955)
Anthony Eden
(1955–1957)
Harold Macmillan
(1957–1960)
Ian Henderson
George Erskine
Kenneth O'Connor
Evelyn Baring
Terence Gavaghan
Dedan Kimathi 
Musa Mwariama
Waruhiu Itote
Stanley Mathenge (MIA)
Kubu Kubu 
Strength
10,000 regular troops
21,000 police
25,000 Kikuyu Home Guard
35,000+ insurgents
Casualties and losses

3,000 native Kenyan police and soldiers killed

95 British military personnel killed
12,000–20,000+ killed (including 1,090 executed)
2,633 captured
2,714 surrendered

The Mau Mau rebellion (1952–1960), also known as the Mau Mau uprising or Kenya Emergency, was an armed conflict in the British Colony of Kenya between the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) and the British colonial authorities. While the KLFA was primarily composed of Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu fighters, the movement also drew support from units of Kamba and Maasai. Groups such as the Luo and Kalenjin — who had led significant earlier resistance movements against colonial establishment, such as the Nandi Resistance (1890–1906) were largely not part of the KLFA's core structure. Instead, many from these communities served in the King's African Rifles (KAR), the colonial military force through which the British maintained internal security and quelled the uprising. The KLFA fought against the British Army and the local Kenya Regiment, which included European settlers and African loyalists.

The capture of Field Marshal Dedan Kimathi on 21 October 1956 signalled the defeat of the Mau Mau, and essentially ended the British military campaign. However, the rebellion survived until after Kenya's independence from Britain, driven mainly by the Meru units led by Field Marshal Musa Mwariama. General Baimungi, one of the last Mau Mau leaders, was killed shortly after Kenya attained self-rule.

The KLFA failed to capture wide public support. Frank Füredi, in The Mau Mau War in Perspective, suggests this was due to a British divide and rule strategy, which they had developed in suppressing the Malayan Emergency (1948–60). The Mau Mau movement remained internally divided, despite attempts to unify the factions. On the colonial side, the uprising created a rift between the European colonial community in Kenya and the metropole, as well as violent divisions within the Kikuyu community: "Much of the struggle tore through the African communities themselves, an internecine war waged between rebels and 'loyalists' – Africans who took the side of the government and opposed Mau Mau." Suppressing the Mau Mau Uprising in the Kenyan colony cost Britain £55 million and caused at least 11,000 deaths among the Mau Mau and other forces, with some estimates considerably higher. This included 1,090 executions by hanging.