Johann Heinrich von Schmitt

Johann Heinrich von Schmitt
Johann Heinrich von Schmitt, after his retirement in 1800. Copperplate engraving by Blasius Höfel (1792–1863)
Born1743
Died11 November 1805(1805-11-11) (aged 61–62)
Dürenstein, Austria 48°23′14″N 15°31′13″E / 48.38722°N 15.52028°E / 48.38722; 15.52028
Allegiance Habsburg Monarchy
BranchChief of the Quartermaster General Staff of the Army
Service years1761–1800; November 1805 
RankFeldmarshalleutnant
ConflictsFrench Revolutionary Wars
War of the Third Coalition

Johann Heinrich von Schmitt (1743 – 11 November 1805) was an officer in the Army of the Holy Roman Empire. He was arguably one of the most successful chiefs of staff; he rose to the rank of Feldmarshalleutnant during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. However, he was criticized as a tactician on a battlefield.

He developed a sound military reputation as a surveyor, map-maker, and strategist during Austria's wars with the Ottoman Empire. He served on the Quartermaster's staff during the War of the First Coalition. He was the mastermind behind the Rhine Campaign of 1796. As a major general, he was one of Archduke Charles' trusted advisers during the War of the Second Coalition campaign in southwestern Germany.

In 1799, his reputation was tarnished by the assassination of the French delegates to the Congress of Rastatt, but his complicity was not proven. In a letter to Emperor Francis II of 18 May 1799, Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen, tried to blame him to some extent for issuing an injudicious order to seize the diplomats' papers and their relationship soured. He retired the following year due to conflicts with the new commander in chief of the Habsburg army, Paul Kray. When war broke out again in 1805, he was recalled from retirement and assigned to the combined Russian-Austrian forces on the Danube. On 11 November, Schmitt was killed by friendly fire at the Battle of Dürenstein, his disposition of the Allied troops for which led to the indecisive outcome, despite their numerical superiority. Schmitt's disposition for this battle ignored moral categories, was excessively complex and did not take into account such considerations as possible disruptions in the advance of columns, the poor quality of roads, the difficulty in the absence of modern means of communication, and the control of scattered units. Mikhail Kutuzov was more of a strategist than a tactician, so he decided to rely on Schmitt's intelligence, who knew the area.