Epistemic injustice

Epistemic injustice occurs when an individual or group is wronged in their “capacity as a knower”, meaning that their ability to produce knowledge is called into question. The term was coined by British philosopher Miranda Fricker in 1998. In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Fricker explains how socially privileged groups are given an “excess of credibility”, meaning they are treated as the authority on their own experiences, but also those of others different from them. Conversely, oppressed groups experience a “credibility deficit”, where they are regarded as unqualified to describe even their own experiences. The assignment of this credibility or lack thereof is often a result of existing systemic hierarchies and normative standards, both of which are often so deeply ingrained within societies that even members of marginalized groups may become convinced of its truth.

Epistemic injustice includes exclusion and silencing; systematic distortion or misrepresentation of one's meanings or contributions; undervaluing of one's status or standing in communicative practices; unfair distinctions in authority; and unwarranted distrust. According to Fricker, there are two kinds of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.