Commitment device

A commitment device is a mechanism or arrangement that implements precommitment by deliberately restricting one’s own future options in order to make a commitment credible. In game theory, commitment devices are strategic moves that constrain an agent’s choices to influence an adversary or negotiating partner, as when a general burns bridges to make retreat impossible or a state adopts a nuclear deterrence posture that makes retaliation automatic. In behavioral economics, they are voluntary self-imposed constraints—such as savings accounts with withdrawal penalties or contracts that impose costs for failure—designed to help individuals follow through on intentions they might otherwise abandon due to akrasia (weakness of will) or time-inconsistent preferences.

The concept emerged independently in the mid-1950s, when Thomas Schelling analyzed commitment as a bargaining tactic and Robert Strotz modeled how a rational agent might benefit from constraining future choices.

Experimental research on the topic exists, but has focused primarily on a specific type of device known as “commitment contracts”—formalized agreements in which a person accepts a penalty for failing to meet a self-chosen goal. These have produced meaningful increases in savings in developing-country field trials, but evidence for sustained effects on health behaviors such as exercise and smoking cessation is more limited.