Battle of Longewala

Battle of Longewala
Part of the India–Pakistan war of 1971

Tank tracks at Longewala. Photographic reconnaissance image taken at the time showing the last-minute manoeuvres against Pakistani tanks in the Longewala sector. Circles show destroyed Pakistani tanks.
Date4–7 December 1971
(3 days)
Location27°31′30″N 70°09′24″E / 27.524942°N 70.156693°E / 27.524942; 70.156693
Result Indian victory
Belligerents
India Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Major K. S. Chandpuri
  • Wing Cdr. D. M. Conquest
  • Major Atma Singh
  • Maj Gen. B. M. Mustafa
  • Brig. Tariq Mir
  • Brig. Jahanzeb Abab
  • Lt. Col. Akram Hussain
  • Lt. Col. Zahir Alam Khan
Units involved

 Indian Army


 Indian Air Force

  • 122 Squadron

 Pakistan Army

  • 18th Infantry Division
    • 206 Brigade
    • 51 Brigade
    • 22 Cavalry (T-59)
    • 38 Cavalry (Sherman)
    • Field Rgt. (25 pdr)
    • 120 mm mortar battery
    • 130 mm med. battery
Strength

1 Company (120 personnel) accompanied by half a platoon (6-7 border guards)
2 Medium machine guns
2 L16 81mm mortars
4 PIAT anti-tank rocket launchers
2 Jonga-borne 106mm M40 RCL gun
4 Hawker Hunters
3 HAL Maruts

10 Camels

2 Mobile infantry brigade (2,000–3,000 personnel)
40 tanks
1 field regiment

2 artillery batteries
Casualties and losses
  • 200–300 personnel killed
  • 36 tanks destroyed or abandoned
  • 100+ armored vehicles destroyed or abandoned
  • Location within Rajasthan

    The Battle of Longewala (4–7 December 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the western sector during the India–Pakistan war of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desert of Rajasthan. The battle was fought between 120 Indian soldiers accompanied by four Hawker Hunter and three HAL Marut fighter-bombers and 2,000–3,000 Pakistani soldiers accompanied by 40 tanks. It is considered one of the greatest battles in the history of the Indian Army and a military victory against the odds.

    A company of the Indian Army's 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, commanded by Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, was left with the choice of either attempting to hold out until reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a Pakistani mechanized infantry force. Choosing the former, Chandpuri ensured that all his assets were correctly deployed and made the best use of his strong defensive position, as well as weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics. He was also fortunate that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure and direct aircraft in support of the post's defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later.

    The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of their strategic intelligence to foresee the availability of Indian fighter-bombers in the Longewala area, exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance. This left the Pakistani brigade group extremely vulnerable. Their armored vehicles, attempting to deploy from a single track, bogged down in unsuitable terrain and were exposed to air attack. Their use of external fuel storage in tactical combat made them even more susceptible to enemy fire. Furthermore, the night attack over unfamiliar ground quickly fell apart. The infantry was surprised by unexpected obstacles, causing confusion which stalled the assault. This negated the concealment that otherwise would have protected them from Indian small arms and infantry support weapon fire.