1957 Defence White Paper

The 1957 White Paper on Defence (Cmnd. 124) was a British white paper issued in March 1957 setting forth the perceived future of the British military. Duncan Sandys, the recently appointed Minister of Defence, produced the paper. It had profound effects on all aspects of the defence industry but probably the most affected was the British aircraft industry. The decisions were influenced by two major factors: the finances of the country and the coming of the missile age.

In the past, combat in the air would have been between high flying aircraft, bombers carrying nuclear weapons and interceptor fighter aircraft trying to stop them. Now the ballistic missile could deliver these weapons with no possible defensive response. In this new environment, the interceptors and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), along with their associated radar networks, seemed superfluous. Likewise, it appeared new manned aircraft of any sort would have little utility in airspace dominated by SAMs. Numerous ongoing projects were abandoned, leaving too little work for the large number of aircraft companies. The paper suggested that the companies join forces to rationalize their operations for a future in which there would be smaller numbers of military projects.

At the time, the Army had a strong presence in Germany as a counter to Warsaw Pact forces. The paper noted that its ultimate goal was not to stop the Pact forces, but to act as a tripwire force to deter any attack as it would result in a larger British response – the actual battle was assumed to be carried out by nuclear weapons. The size of the Army was far larger than it had to be for this role, and led to reductions in the Army's size.

Only the Royal Navy was left significantly unchanged. The paper noted its important role in smaller engagements like the Korean War, and refocussed it on force projection rather than all-out battle with a Soviet fleet. The paper noted that the outcome of a continental nuclear war was not entirely obvious, and that continued fighting would give time for the large Soviet conventional submarine fleet to sortie. The paper suggested the Navy improve its anti-submarine capabilities and its ability to work in concert with other NATO forces.